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和四年前比,美國(guó)變得更好了嗎?

這是美國(guó)選民必須考慮的一個(gè)問(wèn)題。

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40年前,一位69歲的總統(tǒng)候選人站在克利夫蘭的辯論臺(tái)上,距離現(xiàn)任總統(tǒng)站的位置只有15英尺遠(yuǎn)。他轉(zhuǎn)向電視觀眾,提出了似乎一夜之間改變選情的問(wèn)題:“你過(guò)得比四年前好嗎?”

那是1980年10月28日,此前民意調(diào)查顯示,加州前州長(zhǎng)共和黨人羅納德·里根和時(shí)任美國(guó)總統(tǒng)吉米·卡特兩位候選人競(jìng)爭(zhēng)非常激烈,最新一次民調(diào)幾乎平分秋色。但當(dāng)晚90分鐘的友好交流結(jié)束時(shí),里根拋出的問(wèn)題瞬間讓局勢(shì)明朗。當(dāng)時(shí),美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)在“滯脹”的沉重壓力下一蹶不振,大致可以理解為“一切都很糟糕”,失業(yè)率高達(dá)7.5%,通脹率飆升,汽油價(jià)格在之前一年里攀升了超過(guò)三分之一。號(hào)稱(chēng)“偉大溝通者”的里根幾句話便點(diǎn)出了陰暗現(xiàn)實(shí),一周后他獲得壓倒性優(yōu)勢(shì),50個(gè)州拿下了44個(gè)州,順利入主白宮。

四十年后,又一次遭逢總統(tǒng)大選的風(fēng)口浪尖,當(dāng)年里根提出的問(wèn)題似乎還是最能觸動(dòng)選民。或許你猜到了,一些民調(diào)機(jī)構(gòu)確實(shí)提出了同樣的問(wèn)題。9月英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》(Financial Times)和彼得森基金會(huì)(Peterson Foundation)的調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn),與四年前相比,35%的美國(guó)選民感覺(jué)現(xiàn)在的財(cái)務(wù)狀況更好,31%的人感覺(jué)更糟。后來(lái)蓋洛普(Gallup)的一項(xiàng)民意調(diào)查結(jié)果則更加樂(lè)觀,明顯多數(shù)登記投票者(56%)表示現(xiàn)在過(guò)得更好。從兩項(xiàng)調(diào)查結(jié)果來(lái)看,似乎對(duì)與前副總統(tǒng)拜登對(duì)決的特朗普來(lái)說(shuō)都是好消息。

但意外仍然存在,畢竟僅憑調(diào)研很難預(yù)測(cè)選民實(shí)際的投票結(jié)果?!拔覀冏隽撕芏嘌芯浚瑥膩?lái)沒(méi)真正發(fā)現(xiàn)人們的財(cái)務(wù)狀況跟投票結(jié)果之間有聯(lián)系。”杰弗里·瓊斯說(shuō),他負(fù)責(zé)蓋洛普美國(guó)民調(diào)業(yè)務(wù),也包括之前提到的“是否過(guò)得更好”調(diào)查?!叭藗兺镀睍r(shí)并不會(huì)完全考慮自身利益,而是真正從社會(huì)出發(fā)。也就是說(shuō),他們更關(guān)心社會(huì)實(shí)際情況,而不是只看自身處境。”他說(shuō)。

圖片來(lái)源:Photo-Illustration by Selman Design

瓊斯說(shuō),蓋洛普的三項(xiàng)調(diào)查預(yù)測(cè)大選結(jié)果更準(zhǔn),相關(guān)調(diào)查可以判斷美國(guó)人對(duì)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的信心、對(duì)美國(guó)現(xiàn)狀的滿意程度,以及對(duì)總統(tǒng)的認(rèn)可程度,而且看的是全國(guó)總體情況。(在每項(xiàng)里,總統(tǒng)的支持率目前都偏低,尤其是跟之前贏得連任的總統(tǒng)相比。)

那么,選民面臨的根本問(wèn)題并不是“我過(guò)得更好嗎?”而是“我們過(guò)得更好嗎?”這也正是40年前里根提問(wèn)的真正重點(diǎn),然而該事實(shí)常常遭到忽視。1980年里根對(duì)電視觀眾進(jìn)一步發(fā)問(wèn)時(shí)就提到:

你去商店買(mǎi)東西比四年前方便嗎?美國(guó)失業(yè)率是比四年前高還是低?美國(guó)在全世界受尊敬的程度跟以前一樣嗎?你覺(jué)得我們的安全程度像四年前一樣嗎?

現(xiàn)在的美國(guó)選民正在面臨更多的問(wèn)題,也許會(huì)更深刻地影響美國(guó)的國(guó)民認(rèn)同,包括我們共同的使命感、對(duì)政府和社會(huì)機(jī)構(gòu)的信任,甚至是交談和傾聽(tīng)的方式。當(dāng)然每次選舉中,選民都會(huì)不可避免地根據(jù)意識(shí)形態(tài)、哲學(xué)或道德做出個(gè)人選擇。不過(guò),今年各政治派別的選民投票前都應(yīng)該問(wèn)一個(gè)基本問(wèn)題:比起四年前,美國(guó)是否更加團(tuán)結(jié)?

我還是我們

“不管任何時(shí)候,也不管在哪里的社會(huì),人性都是統(tǒng)治政治的基本力量?!边~克·萊維特說(shuō),他曾經(jīng)三次當(dāng)選猶他州的州長(zhǎng),后來(lái)在小布什政府擔(dān)任美國(guó)衛(wèi)生和公眾服務(wù)部(U.S. Health and Human Services)的部長(zhǎng)?!拔疫^(guò)得更好嗎?”以及“我們過(guò)得更好嗎?”確實(shí)能夠代表個(gè)人自由和安全之間的沖突。為了獲得其中之一,不得不放棄另一項(xiàng)。保守派共和黨人萊維特認(rèn)為,自由和安全兩大永恒目標(biāo)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)乃正當(dāng)合理,甚至必要。但他擔(dān)心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)太過(guò)殘酷,不過(guò)他也辯稱(chēng),尖酸刻薄的言辭累計(jì)遠(yuǎn)不止過(guò)去四年時(shí)間?!拔覀儼l(fā)現(xiàn)身處兩個(gè)極端的人們似乎都愿意越界,打破民主的盟約。這讓人不適,也使人害怕,因?yàn)檫@與社會(huì)上公認(rèn)的(契約)并不一致?!?/font>

皮尤研究中心(Pew Research Center)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,左翼和右翼、民主黨和共和黨之間的分歧越發(fā)嚴(yán)重。盡管主要政黨在某些問(wèn)題上的分歧越來(lái)越大,但最讓人擔(dān)心的并非意識(shí)形態(tài),而是關(guān)乎個(gè)人。皮尤中心的政治研究主任卡羅爾·多爾蒂表示:“黨派反感是指,我不僅不同意反對(duì)黨,對(duì)該黨派的人看法也相當(dāng)負(fù)面,20世紀(jì)90年代中期以來(lái)黨派反感現(xiàn)象一直在加劇。”多爾蒂說(shuō),2016年各種負(fù)面情緒開(kāi)始激增。皮尤研究中心的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,認(rèn)為民主黨人比一般美國(guó)人道德敗壞的共和黨人比例從2016年的47%上升到2019年的55%。民主黨人認(rèn)為共和黨人道德敗壞的比例則上升了12個(gè)百分點(diǎn),從35%上升到47%。皮尤調(diào)查顯示,近三分之二(63%)的共和黨人表示,民主黨人比一般美國(guó)人“不愛(ài)國(guó)”(23%的民主黨人認(rèn)為共和黨人不夠愛(ài)國(guó)),而且兩黨里認(rèn)為對(duì)手黨比一般人“心胸狹窄”或“懶惰”的比例也在攀升。兩黨認(rèn)為分歧在擴(kuò)大的人都占?jí)旱剐远鄶?shù),約四分之三的共和黨人和民主黨人承認(rèn),探討對(duì)方觀點(diǎn)時(shí),“無(wú)法就基本事實(shí)達(dá)成一致”。皮尤研究中心發(fā)現(xiàn),令人沮喪的是,如果涉及放棄任何利益,兩黨里都有很大比例成員(53%的共和黨人和41%的民主黨人)不希望領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人與對(duì)方尋求“共同基礎(chǔ)”。

多爾蒂?gòu)?qiáng)調(diào),皮尤的最新研究是在總統(tǒng)大選前一年和疫情之前進(jìn)行?!半m然無(wú)從推斷……但相關(guān)負(fù)面情緒可能惡化?!彼赋?。

“這是一場(chǎng)為美國(guó)靈魂的斗爭(zhēng),沒(méi)有哪方能夠獲勝,主要看另一方的威脅?!毙旅绹?guó)研究基金會(huì)(New America foundation)的政治改革項(xiàng)目高級(jí)研究員、政治科學(xué)家李·德魯特曼說(shuō)道?!懊绹?guó)有一半人相信,如果另一半人掌權(quán),國(guó)家是不合法的,而且有極大破壞性?!钡卖斕芈臅?shū)《打破兩黨厄運(yùn)循環(huán):美國(guó)多黨民主的案例》(Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop: The Case for Multiparty Democracy in America)已經(jīng)于今年1月出版,書(shū)中認(rèn)為不斷升級(jí)的超黨派主義已經(jīng)將政治“簡(jiǎn)化”為我們與他們,以及善與惡的二元對(duì)立。

德魯特曼表示,特朗普的言論是激化雙方長(zhǎng)期積累憤怒的“催化劑”。特朗普入主白宮后,在競(jìng)選集會(huì)上發(fā)出的激烈呼吁并未結(jié)束。相關(guān)言論聲量越來(lái)越大,也越發(fā)激烈,還在社交媒體上引發(fā)共鳴。埃默里大學(xué)(Emory University)的政治學(xué)教授阿蘭·阿布拉莫維茨說(shuō):“他從吹狗哨變成了拿著大喇叭喊”——從悄悄挖掘種族、種族和黨派的恨意,變成體育場(chǎng)里的大合唱。

馬里蘭大學(xué)(University of Maryland)的政府與政治副教授、《不文明協(xié)議:政治如何成為我們的身份》(Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity)一書(shū)的作者利利亞娜·梅森說(shuō),特朗普超高分貝大喇叭轟鳴的效果遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了“集會(huì)”,這種行為鼓勵(lì)了以政治為基礎(chǔ)的暴力,甚至變得正?;?。她指出,美國(guó)“反移民”仇恨團(tuán)體增加,與政客反移民言論同步就是例子。(非營(yíng)利機(jī)構(gòu)南方貧困法律中心表示,2014年以來(lái),類(lèi)似激進(jìn)組織的數(shù)量增加了超過(guò)一倍。)“很多人警告稱(chēng)會(huì)出現(xiàn)激進(jìn)的暴力行為,主要是右翼挑起,尤其是在2020年大選前后?!泵飞f(shuō),“不過(guò)美國(guó)各大城市已經(jīng)有全副武裝的士兵巡邏。”10月聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局(FBI)披露,一些自稱(chēng)民兵組織的厚顏無(wú)恥之徒策劃綁架了密歇根州州長(zhǎng)格雷琴·惠特默,潛在的危險(xiǎn)可從中一瞥。梅森表示,這些“都是2016年難以想象的”。

長(zhǎng)長(zhǎng)的待辦清單

盡管負(fù)面的黨派偏見(jiàn)導(dǎo)致美國(guó)社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)撕裂,也增加了立法的挑戰(zhàn)性,尤其是聯(lián)邦層面“想做任何事,都得建立某種程度上的跨黨派同盟,”阿布拉莫維茨說(shuō)。德魯特曼表示,實(shí)際問(wèn)題甚至更嚴(yán)重?!懊绹?guó)制度里的根本沖突之一是,政治體制的出發(fā)點(diǎn)是鼓勵(lì)廣泛妥協(xié),而政黨制度下達(dá)成妥協(xié)很難。所以,從一開(kāi)始選舉和執(zhí)政激勵(lì)機(jī)制就是不同的兩套制度?!闭文Σ辽?jí)只會(huì)擴(kuò)大兩者之間的差別。

為了下一個(gè)世紀(jì)繼續(xù)繁榮發(fā)展,而且世界要比以往更具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力也更經(jīng)濟(jì),美國(guó)人必須投資自身,就像企業(yè)為了發(fā)展要自我投資一樣。這意味著為再就業(yè)計(jì)劃和關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施重建提供資金,具體操作起來(lái)涉及面很廣,從修復(fù)破損的道路和橋梁到建設(shè)先進(jìn)的5G電信網(wǎng)絡(luò)均包括在內(nèi)。社會(huì)保障體系的不穩(wěn)定性也未減輕,需要以某種方式修正。我們要控制失控的醫(yī)保費(fèi)用,控制仍然在肆虐的疫情,更要為今后的疫情做好準(zhǔn)備。還有更棘手的問(wèn)題要面對(duì),包括應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化、刑事司法改革、制定既能夠推動(dòng)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展和美國(guó)安全又可以維護(hù)公平感的移民政策等。到最后,我們還得想辦法幫助因疫情封鎖失業(yè)的數(shù)百萬(wàn)人重返工作崗位(參見(jiàn)我們的選舉方案)。要做的事情可不少。

為待辦事項(xiàng)花錢(qián)可以說(shuō)是更加艱巨的挑戰(zhàn),兩黨揮金如土的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人已經(jīng)掏空了美國(guó)的錢(qián)包,而人們已經(jīng)窮到快穿不起褲子。國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室(見(jiàn)圖表)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,到2023年公眾持有的聯(lián)邦債務(wù)將達(dá)到美國(guó)GDP的106%,而且屆時(shí)起紅線將繼續(xù)上升。解決問(wèn)題需要?jiǎng)?chuàng)造性和雄心,意味著交戰(zhàn)雙方要盡棄前嫌共同努力。

公眾持有的聯(lián)邦債務(wù),占GDP的比例。資料來(lái)源:國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室

這也意味著我們也要刺激美國(guó)商業(yè)增長(zhǎng)?!叭绻f(shuō)解決辦法就是創(chuàng)新,聽(tīng)起來(lái)可能有點(diǎn)偏學(xué)術(shù),也有點(diǎn)空想。”哥倫比亞大學(xué)資本主義與社會(huì)中心(Center on Capitalism and Society at Columbia University)的主任,2006年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主埃德蒙·菲爾普斯說(shuō)?!暗蠈?shí)說(shuō),如果不能推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展得比過(guò)去40年或50年好,今后還能夠有多少進(jìn)展真不一定。”菲爾普斯說(shuō),很高興看到企業(yè)開(kāi)始積極抵制特朗普政府的關(guān)稅以及“阻礙企業(yè)開(kāi)發(fā)產(chǎn)品所需人才”的移民政策。菲爾普斯特別希望下一屆政府能積極開(kāi)展國(guó)際貿(mào)易。“國(guó)際貿(mào)易可能是美國(guó)商業(yè)部門(mén)新能源的來(lái)源。對(duì)就業(yè)、工資和其他方面都大有裨益。”他說(shuō)。

微軟(Microsoft)的董事會(huì)成員、紐約私募股權(quán)公司Clayton Dubilier&Rice的合伙人桑迪·彼得森同樣對(duì)特朗普的移民政策很失望。她說(shuō):“如果我們不能齊心協(xié)力,美國(guó)的創(chuàng)新引擎將不復(fù)存在,創(chuàng)新引擎就是吸引全世界最聰明的人,創(chuàng)造令人驚艷的新產(chǎn)品。人們不再來(lái)這里學(xué)習(xí),由于拿不到簽證,人們也無(wú)法來(lái)這工作?!北说蒙?jīng)擔(dān)任強(qiáng)生(Johnson & Johnson)的全球董事長(zhǎng),她還表示,吸引海外人才“是長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)推動(dòng)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的原因,我們卻搞砸了?!?/font>

選民在這方面面臨的挑戰(zhàn)是,思考解決問(wèn)題的最佳辦法,是再給特朗普一次機(jī)會(huì),還是換個(gè)人重新開(kāi)始。

信任和信譽(yù)

無(wú)論2021年1月20日誰(shuí)上臺(tái),都將面臨另一項(xiàng)緊迫任務(wù):重建對(duì)政府機(jī)構(gòu)本身的信任。過(guò)去四年里,疾病預(yù)防控制中心(CDC)、食品與藥品管理局(FDA)和司法部(Justice Department)之類(lèi)過(guò)去被認(rèn)為無(wú)黨派且不受政治壓力影響的機(jī)構(gòu),似乎都對(duì)白宮唯命是從,受到很多人質(zhì)疑。新美國(guó)研究基金會(huì)的德魯特曼說(shuō):“之前這些機(jī)構(gòu)都是中立的仲裁者,如果政治體系中人們能夠就基本的程序公平達(dá)成一致,并接受合理的反對(duì)意見(jiàn),這些機(jī)構(gòu)就可以保持獨(dú)立?!钡硖幙駸岬某h派時(shí)代,理想的政治體系似乎已經(jīng)不復(fù)存在。

馬里蘭大學(xué)的梅森表示,內(nèi)訌對(duì)國(guó)家安全造成影響。她提醒說(shuō),喬治·華盛頓總統(tǒng)在告別演說(shuō)中曾經(jīng)發(fā)出警告?!叭绻试S派系存在,就可能自相殘殺,最終導(dǎo)致國(guó)家受到外部干涉;如果制造非常嚴(yán)重的黨派分歧,會(huì)使國(guó)家變?nèi)?,其他?guó)家要攪亂美國(guó)也更容易?!泵飞f(shuō)。

史汀森中心(Stimson Center)是研究全球安全和其他關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題的無(wú)黨派智庫(kù),其總裁兼首席執(zhí)行官布萊恩·芬萊對(duì)此表示贊同。“現(xiàn)在世界上的對(duì)手已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)了美國(guó)制度的根本弱點(diǎn)?!狈胰R說(shuō)。“他們利用黨派分歧,也通過(guò)讓孩子們相信《華盛頓郵報(bào)》(Washington Post)不可信,充分利用了發(fā)現(xiàn)的技術(shù)弱點(diǎn)。我們的對(duì)手越來(lái)越聰明,現(xiàn)在還在攻擊選舉,就像在魚(yú)缸里點(diǎn)殺金魚(yú)一樣簡(jiǎn)單。他們不需要向美國(guó)派遣武裝人員,在地下室的電腦上就能破壞。”

防御此類(lèi)非同步戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)很困難。如果沒(méi)有同盟、關(guān)系和協(xié)議就更難。美國(guó)早已簽訂多邊協(xié)議,阻止冷戰(zhàn)中的蘇聯(lián)擴(kuò)張和侵略,限制核武器在世界各地?cái)U(kuò)散,阻止非法捕魚(yú),當(dāng)然也要出售更多的美國(guó)商品。

然而過(guò)去四年里,特朗普退出了多個(gè)重要的同盟,還威脅要“終止”美國(guó)與世界衛(wèi)生組織(World Health Organization)的聯(lián)系(而且是在全球疫情泛濫期間),1948年世界衛(wèi)生組織由美國(guó)倡議并協(xié)助成立。他還破壞了跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系(TPP)貿(mào)易協(xié)定,芬雷說(shuō)。

美國(guó)退出了里根總統(tǒng)1987年與蘇聯(lián)總理戈?duì)柊蛦谭蚝炇鸬摹吨谐毯宋淦鳁l約(INF)》(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty),當(dāng)年正是該條約推動(dòng)冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束。美國(guó)放棄了兩黨廣泛支持的《開(kāi)放天空條約》(Open Skies Treaty),特朗普還讓美國(guó)退出了應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化的《巴黎協(xié)議》(Paris Agreement)。

對(duì)于美國(guó)的健康、繁榮和安全,以上諸多舉動(dòng)更多都是自我傷害,也是選民投票時(shí)需要考慮的問(wèn)題。最后簡(jiǎn)單地說(shuō)吧,我們比四年前過(guò)得更好,還是應(yīng)該尋求改變了?(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

本文登載于《財(cái)富》雜志2020年11月刊。

譯者:夏林

40年前,一位69歲的總統(tǒng)候選人站在克利夫蘭的辯論臺(tái)上,距離現(xiàn)任總統(tǒng)站的位置只有15英尺遠(yuǎn)。他轉(zhuǎn)向電視觀眾,提出了似乎一夜之間改變選情的問(wèn)題:“你過(guò)得比四年前好嗎?”

那是1980年10月28日,此前民意調(diào)查顯示,加州前州長(zhǎng)共和黨人羅納德·里根和時(shí)任美國(guó)總統(tǒng)吉米·卡特兩位候選人競(jìng)爭(zhēng)非常激烈,最新一次民調(diào)幾乎平分秋色。但當(dāng)晚90分鐘的友好交流結(jié)束時(shí),里根拋出的問(wèn)題瞬間讓局勢(shì)明朗。當(dāng)時(shí),美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)在“滯脹”的沉重壓力下一蹶不振,大致可以理解為“一切都很糟糕”,失業(yè)率高達(dá)7.5%,通脹率飆升,汽油價(jià)格在之前一年里攀升了超過(guò)三分之一。號(hào)稱(chēng)“偉大溝通者”的里根幾句話便點(diǎn)出了陰暗現(xiàn)實(shí),一周后他獲得壓倒性優(yōu)勢(shì),50個(gè)州拿下了44個(gè)州,順利入主白宮。

四十年后,又一次遭逢總統(tǒng)大選的風(fēng)口浪尖,當(dāng)年里根提出的問(wèn)題似乎還是最能觸動(dòng)選民?;蛟S你猜到了,一些民調(diào)機(jī)構(gòu)確實(shí)提出了同樣的問(wèn)題。9月英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》(Financial Times)和彼得森基金會(huì)(Peterson Foundation)的調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn),與四年前相比,35%的美國(guó)選民感覺(jué)現(xiàn)在的財(cái)務(wù)狀況更好,31%的人感覺(jué)更糟。后來(lái)蓋洛普(Gallup)的一項(xiàng)民意調(diào)查結(jié)果則更加樂(lè)觀,明顯多數(shù)登記投票者(56%)表示現(xiàn)在過(guò)得更好。從兩項(xiàng)調(diào)查結(jié)果來(lái)看,似乎對(duì)與前副總統(tǒng)拜登對(duì)決的特朗普來(lái)說(shuō)都是好消息。

但意外仍然存在,畢竟僅憑調(diào)研很難預(yù)測(cè)選民實(shí)際的投票結(jié)果?!拔覀冏隽撕芏嘌芯?,從來(lái)沒(méi)真正發(fā)現(xiàn)人們的財(cái)務(wù)狀況跟投票結(jié)果之間有聯(lián)系?!苯芨ダ铩き偹拐f(shuō),他負(fù)責(zé)蓋洛普美國(guó)民調(diào)業(yè)務(wù),也包括之前提到的“是否過(guò)得更好”調(diào)查。“人們投票時(shí)并不會(huì)完全考慮自身利益,而是真正從社會(huì)出發(fā)。也就是說(shuō),他們更關(guān)心社會(huì)實(shí)際情況,而不是只看自身處境?!彼f(shuō)。

瓊斯說(shuō),蓋洛普的三項(xiàng)調(diào)查預(yù)測(cè)大選結(jié)果更準(zhǔn),相關(guān)調(diào)查可以判斷美國(guó)人對(duì)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的信心、對(duì)美國(guó)現(xiàn)狀的滿意程度,以及對(duì)總統(tǒng)的認(rèn)可程度,而且看的是全國(guó)總體情況。(在每項(xiàng)里,總統(tǒng)的支持率目前都偏低,尤其是跟之前贏得連任的總統(tǒng)相比。)

那么,選民面臨的根本問(wèn)題并不是“我過(guò)得更好嗎?”而是“我們過(guò)得更好嗎?”這也正是40年前里根提問(wèn)的真正重點(diǎn),然而該事實(shí)常常遭到忽視。1980年里根對(duì)電視觀眾進(jìn)一步發(fā)問(wèn)時(shí)就提到:

你去商店買(mǎi)東西比四年前方便嗎?美國(guó)失業(yè)率是比四年前高還是低?美國(guó)在全世界受尊敬的程度跟以前一樣嗎?你覺(jué)得我們的安全程度像四年前一樣嗎?

現(xiàn)在的美國(guó)選民正在面臨更多的問(wèn)題,也許會(huì)更深刻地影響美國(guó)的國(guó)民認(rèn)同,包括我們共同的使命感、對(duì)政府和社會(huì)機(jī)構(gòu)的信任,甚至是交談和傾聽(tīng)的方式。當(dāng)然每次選舉中,選民都會(huì)不可避免地根據(jù)意識(shí)形態(tài)、哲學(xué)或道德做出個(gè)人選擇。不過(guò),今年各政治派別的選民投票前都應(yīng)該問(wèn)一個(gè)基本問(wèn)題:比起四年前,美國(guó)是否更加團(tuán)結(jié)?

我還是我們

“不管任何時(shí)候,也不管在哪里的社會(huì),人性都是統(tǒng)治政治的基本力量?!边~克·萊維特說(shuō),他曾經(jīng)三次當(dāng)選猶他州的州長(zhǎng),后來(lái)在小布什政府擔(dān)任美國(guó)衛(wèi)生和公眾服務(wù)部(U.S. Health and Human Services)的部長(zhǎng)?!拔疫^(guò)得更好嗎?”以及“我們過(guò)得更好嗎?”確實(shí)能夠代表個(gè)人自由和安全之間的沖突。為了獲得其中之一,不得不放棄另一項(xiàng)。保守派共和黨人萊維特認(rèn)為,自由和安全兩大永恒目標(biāo)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)乃正當(dāng)合理,甚至必要。但他擔(dān)心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)太過(guò)殘酷,不過(guò)他也辯稱(chēng),尖酸刻薄的言辭累計(jì)遠(yuǎn)不止過(guò)去四年時(shí)間?!拔覀儼l(fā)現(xiàn)身處兩個(gè)極端的人們似乎都愿意越界,打破民主的盟約。這讓人不適,也使人害怕,因?yàn)檫@與社會(huì)上公認(rèn)的(契約)并不一致?!?/font>

皮尤研究中心(Pew Research Center)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,左翼和右翼、民主黨和共和黨之間的分歧越發(fā)嚴(yán)重。盡管主要政黨在某些問(wèn)題上的分歧越來(lái)越大,但最讓人擔(dān)心的并非意識(shí)形態(tài),而是關(guān)乎個(gè)人。皮尤中心的政治研究主任卡羅爾·多爾蒂表示:“黨派反感是指,我不僅不同意反對(duì)黨,對(duì)該黨派的人看法也相當(dāng)負(fù)面,20世紀(jì)90年代中期以來(lái)黨派反感現(xiàn)象一直在加劇?!倍酄柕僬f(shuō),2016年各種負(fù)面情緒開(kāi)始激增。皮尤研究中心的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,認(rèn)為民主黨人比一般美國(guó)人道德敗壞的共和黨人比例從2016年的47%上升到2019年的55%。民主黨人認(rèn)為共和黨人道德敗壞的比例則上升了12個(gè)百分點(diǎn),從35%上升到47%。皮尤調(diào)查顯示,近三分之二(63%)的共和黨人表示,民主黨人比一般美國(guó)人“不愛(ài)國(guó)”(23%的民主黨人認(rèn)為共和黨人不夠愛(ài)國(guó)),而且兩黨里認(rèn)為對(duì)手黨比一般人“心胸狹窄”或“懶惰”的比例也在攀升。兩黨認(rèn)為分歧在擴(kuò)大的人都占?jí)旱剐远鄶?shù),約四分之三的共和黨人和民主黨人承認(rèn),探討對(duì)方觀點(diǎn)時(shí),“無(wú)法就基本事實(shí)達(dá)成一致”。皮尤研究中心發(fā)現(xiàn),令人沮喪的是,如果涉及放棄任何利益,兩黨里都有很大比例成員(53%的共和黨人和41%的民主黨人)不希望領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人與對(duì)方尋求“共同基礎(chǔ)”。

多爾蒂?gòu)?qiáng)調(diào),皮尤的最新研究是在總統(tǒng)大選前一年和疫情之前進(jìn)行?!半m然無(wú)從推斷……但相關(guān)負(fù)面情緒可能惡化?!彼赋?。

“這是一場(chǎng)為美國(guó)靈魂的斗爭(zhēng),沒(méi)有哪方能夠獲勝,主要看另一方的威脅。”新美國(guó)研究基金會(huì)(New America foundation)的政治改革項(xiàng)目高級(jí)研究員、政治科學(xué)家李·德魯特曼說(shuō)道?!懊绹?guó)有一半人相信,如果另一半人掌權(quán),國(guó)家是不合法的,而且有極大破壞性?!钡卖斕芈臅?shū)《打破兩黨厄運(yùn)循環(huán):美國(guó)多黨民主的案例》(Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop: The Case for Multiparty Democracy in America)已經(jīng)于今年1月出版,書(shū)中認(rèn)為不斷升級(jí)的超黨派主義已經(jīng)將政治“簡(jiǎn)化”為我們與他們,以及善與惡的二元對(duì)立。

德魯特曼表示,特朗普的言論是激化雙方長(zhǎng)期積累憤怒的“催化劑”。特朗普入主白宮后,在競(jìng)選集會(huì)上發(fā)出的激烈呼吁并未結(jié)束。相關(guān)言論聲量越來(lái)越大,也越發(fā)激烈,還在社交媒體上引發(fā)共鳴。埃默里大學(xué)(Emory University)的政治學(xué)教授阿蘭·阿布拉莫維茨說(shuō):“他從吹狗哨變成了拿著大喇叭喊”——從悄悄挖掘種族、種族和黨派的恨意,變成體育場(chǎng)里的大合唱。

馬里蘭大學(xué)(University of Maryland)的政府與政治副教授、《不文明協(xié)議:政治如何成為我們的身份》(Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity)一書(shū)的作者利利亞娜·梅森說(shuō),特朗普超高分貝大喇叭轟鳴的效果遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了“集會(huì)”,這種行為鼓勵(lì)了以政治為基礎(chǔ)的暴力,甚至變得正常化。她指出,美國(guó)“反移民”仇恨團(tuán)體增加,與政客反移民言論同步就是例子。(非營(yíng)利機(jī)構(gòu)南方貧困法律中心表示,2014年以來(lái),類(lèi)似激進(jìn)組織的數(shù)量增加了超過(guò)一倍。)“很多人警告稱(chēng)會(huì)出現(xiàn)激進(jìn)的暴力行為,主要是右翼挑起,尤其是在2020年大選前后?!泵飞f(shuō),“不過(guò)美國(guó)各大城市已經(jīng)有全副武裝的士兵巡邏。”10月聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局(FBI)披露,一些自稱(chēng)民兵組織的厚顏無(wú)恥之徒策劃綁架了密歇根州州長(zhǎng)格雷琴·惠特默,潛在的危險(xiǎn)可從中一瞥。梅森表示,這些“都是2016年難以想象的”。

長(zhǎng)長(zhǎng)的待辦清單

盡管負(fù)面的黨派偏見(jiàn)導(dǎo)致美國(guó)社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)撕裂,也增加了立法的挑戰(zhàn)性,尤其是聯(lián)邦層面“想做任何事,都得建立某種程度上的跨黨派同盟,”阿布拉莫維茨說(shuō)。德魯特曼表示,實(shí)際問(wèn)題甚至更嚴(yán)重?!懊绹?guó)制度里的根本沖突之一是,政治體制的出發(fā)點(diǎn)是鼓勵(lì)廣泛妥協(xié),而政黨制度下達(dá)成妥協(xié)很難。所以,從一開(kāi)始選舉和執(zhí)政激勵(lì)機(jī)制就是不同的兩套制度。”政治摩擦升級(jí)只會(huì)擴(kuò)大兩者之間的差別。

為了下一個(gè)世紀(jì)繼續(xù)繁榮發(fā)展,而且世界要比以往更具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力也更經(jīng)濟(jì),美國(guó)人必須投資自身,就像企業(yè)為了發(fā)展要自我投資一樣。這意味著為再就業(yè)計(jì)劃和關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施重建提供資金,具體操作起來(lái)涉及面很廣,從修復(fù)破損的道路和橋梁到建設(shè)先進(jìn)的5G電信網(wǎng)絡(luò)均包括在內(nèi)。社會(huì)保障體系的不穩(wěn)定性也未減輕,需要以某種方式修正。我們要控制失控的醫(yī)保費(fèi)用,控制仍然在肆虐的疫情,更要為今后的疫情做好準(zhǔn)備。還有更棘手的問(wèn)題要面對(duì),包括應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化、刑事司法改革、制定既能夠推動(dòng)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展和美國(guó)安全又可以維護(hù)公平感的移民政策等。到最后,我們還得想辦法幫助因疫情封鎖失業(yè)的數(shù)百萬(wàn)人重返工作崗位(參見(jiàn)我們的選舉方案)。要做的事情可不少。

為待辦事項(xiàng)花錢(qián)可以說(shuō)是更加艱巨的挑戰(zhàn),兩黨揮金如土的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人已經(jīng)掏空了美國(guó)的錢(qián)包,而人們已經(jīng)窮到快穿不起褲子。國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室(見(jiàn)圖表)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,到2023年公眾持有的聯(lián)邦債務(wù)將達(dá)到美國(guó)GDP的106%,而且屆時(shí)起紅線將繼續(xù)上升。解決問(wèn)題需要?jiǎng)?chuàng)造性和雄心,意味著交戰(zhàn)雙方要盡棄前嫌共同努力。

這也意味著我們也要刺激美國(guó)商業(yè)增長(zhǎng)?!叭绻f(shuō)解決辦法就是創(chuàng)新,聽(tīng)起來(lái)可能有點(diǎn)偏學(xué)術(shù),也有點(diǎn)空想?!备鐐惐葋喆髮W(xué)資本主義與社會(huì)中心(Center on Capitalism and Society at Columbia University)的主任,2006年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主埃德蒙·菲爾普斯說(shuō)?!暗蠈?shí)說(shuō),如果不能推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展得比過(guò)去40年或50年好,今后還能夠有多少進(jìn)展真不一定?!狈茽柶账拐f(shuō),很高興看到企業(yè)開(kāi)始積極抵制特朗普政府的關(guān)稅以及“阻礙企業(yè)開(kāi)發(fā)產(chǎn)品所需人才”的移民政策。菲爾普斯特別希望下一屆政府能積極開(kāi)展國(guó)際貿(mào)易?!皣?guó)際貿(mào)易可能是美國(guó)商業(yè)部門(mén)新能源的來(lái)源。對(duì)就業(yè)、工資和其他方面都大有裨益。”他說(shuō)。

微軟(Microsoft)的董事會(huì)成員、紐約私募股權(quán)公司Clayton Dubilier&Rice的合伙人桑迪·彼得森同樣對(duì)特朗普的移民政策很失望。她說(shuō):“如果我們不能齊心協(xié)力,美國(guó)的創(chuàng)新引擎將不復(fù)存在,創(chuàng)新引擎就是吸引全世界最聰明的人,創(chuàng)造令人驚艷的新產(chǎn)品。人們不再來(lái)這里學(xué)習(xí),由于拿不到簽證,人們也無(wú)法來(lái)這工作?!北说蒙?jīng)擔(dān)任強(qiáng)生(Johnson & Johnson)的全球董事長(zhǎng),她還表示,吸引海外人才“是長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)推動(dòng)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的原因,我們卻搞砸了。”

選民在這方面面臨的挑戰(zhàn)是,思考解決問(wèn)題的最佳辦法,是再給特朗普一次機(jī)會(huì),還是換個(gè)人重新開(kāi)始。

信任和信譽(yù)

無(wú)論2021年1月20日誰(shuí)上臺(tái),都將面臨另一項(xiàng)緊迫任務(wù):重建對(duì)政府機(jī)構(gòu)本身的信任。過(guò)去四年里,疾病預(yù)防控制中心(CDC)、食品與藥品管理局(FDA)和司法部(Justice Department)之類(lèi)過(guò)去被認(rèn)為無(wú)黨派且不受政治壓力影響的機(jī)構(gòu),似乎都對(duì)白宮唯命是從,受到很多人質(zhì)疑。新美國(guó)研究基金會(huì)的德魯特曼說(shuō):“之前這些機(jī)構(gòu)都是中立的仲裁者,如果政治體系中人們能夠就基本的程序公平達(dá)成一致,并接受合理的反對(duì)意見(jiàn),這些機(jī)構(gòu)就可以保持獨(dú)立。”但身處狂熱的超黨派時(shí)代,理想的政治體系似乎已經(jīng)不復(fù)存在。

馬里蘭大學(xué)的梅森表示,內(nèi)訌對(duì)國(guó)家安全造成影響。她提醒說(shuō),喬治·華盛頓總統(tǒng)在告別演說(shuō)中曾經(jīng)發(fā)出警告?!叭绻试S派系存在,就可能自相殘殺,最終導(dǎo)致國(guó)家受到外部干涉;如果制造非常嚴(yán)重的黨派分歧,會(huì)使國(guó)家變?nèi)酰渌麌?guó)家要攪亂美國(guó)也更容易。”梅森說(shuō)。

史汀森中心(Stimson Center)是研究全球安全和其他關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題的無(wú)黨派智庫(kù),其總裁兼首席執(zhí)行官布萊恩·芬萊對(duì)此表示贊同?!艾F(xiàn)在世界上的對(duì)手已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)了美國(guó)制度的根本弱點(diǎn)?!狈胰R說(shuō)?!八麄兝命h派分歧,也通過(guò)讓孩子們相信《華盛頓郵報(bào)》(Washington Post)不可信,充分利用了發(fā)現(xiàn)的技術(shù)弱點(diǎn)。我們的對(duì)手越來(lái)越聰明,現(xiàn)在還在攻擊選舉,就像在魚(yú)缸里點(diǎn)殺金魚(yú)一樣簡(jiǎn)單。他們不需要向美國(guó)派遣武裝人員,在地下室的電腦上就能破壞?!?/font>

防御此類(lèi)非同步戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)很困難。如果沒(méi)有同盟、關(guān)系和協(xié)議就更難。美國(guó)早已簽訂多邊協(xié)議,阻止冷戰(zhàn)中的蘇聯(lián)擴(kuò)張和侵略,限制核武器在世界各地?cái)U(kuò)散,阻止非法捕魚(yú),當(dāng)然也要出售更多的美國(guó)商品。

然而過(guò)去四年里,特朗普退出了多個(gè)重要的同盟,還威脅要“終止”美國(guó)與世界衛(wèi)生組織(World Health Organization)的聯(lián)系(而且是在全球疫情泛濫期間),1948年世界衛(wèi)生組織由美國(guó)倡議并協(xié)助成立。他還破壞了跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系(TPP)貿(mào)易協(xié)定,芬雷說(shuō)。

美國(guó)退出了里根總統(tǒng)1987年與蘇聯(lián)總理戈?duì)柊蛦谭蚝炇鸬摹吨谐毯宋淦鳁l約(INF)》(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty),當(dāng)年正是該條約推動(dòng)冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束。美國(guó)放棄了兩黨廣泛支持的《開(kāi)放天空條約》(Open Skies Treaty),特朗普還讓美國(guó)退出了應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化的《巴黎協(xié)議》(Paris Agreement)。

對(duì)于美國(guó)的健康、繁榮和安全,以上諸多舉動(dòng)更多都是自我傷害,也是選民投票時(shí)需要考慮的問(wèn)題。最后簡(jiǎn)單地說(shuō)吧,我們比四年前過(guò)得更好,還是應(yīng)該尋求改變了?(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

本文登載于《財(cái)富》雜志2020年11月刊。

譯者:夏林

Forty years ago, a 69-year-old candidate for President stood on a Cleveland debate stage 15 feet from the incumbent, turned to the television audience, and asked a question that would seemingly change the race overnight: “Are you better off than you were four years ago?”

It was Oct. 28, 1980, and opinion polls until then had been suggesting a close contest between the two nominees, former California Gov. Ronald Reagan, the Republican, and President Jimmy Carter, the Democrat—with the most recent of surveys splitting down the middle as to who had the edge. But the challenger’s question that evening, posed at the end of a cordial 90-minute exchange, clarified the choice in a flash. The American economy was wilting under the burden of “stagflation,” a portmanteau that roughly translated to “everything stinks”—the unemployment rate was mired at 7.5%, inflation was soaring, gasoline prices had climbed by more than a third in just the past year. Reagan, “the Great Communicator,” had framed those gloomy circumstances in a handful of words—and one week later he won the White House in a landslide, carrying 44 of the 50 states.

Four decades later, on the cusp of another presidential election, it might seem that there’s no question that’s more relevant to voters than the one Reagan asked—and a few pollsters, as you might expect, have already asked it. A September survey by the Financial Times and the Peterson Foundation found that a plurality of U.S. voters, 35%, felt better about their present financial situation, and 31% felt worse, compared with four years ago; a later poll by Gallup painted a more upbeat picture, with a clear majority of registered voters (56%) saying they were better off today. Both surveys would seem to portend good news for President Donald Trump as he faces off against former Vice President Joe Biden.

Yet here’s a surprise: The answers tell us little about how voters will actually fill out their ballots. “We’ve done a lot of research and have never really found a link between people’s own finances and how the vote turned out,” says Jeffrey Jones, who oversees all U.S. polling for Gallup, including the “better off” survey above. “People are not really self-interested when they think about how they’re going to vote, it’s really sociotropic voting: They care more about what’s going on out there as opposed to their own situation,” he says.

Far more predictive of election outcomes, says Jones, are a trio of Gallup surveys—those measuring Americans’ confidence in the economy overall, satisfaction with the way things are going in the U.S., and presidential approval—that look at the state of the nation as a whole. (In each, the President’s rating is currently underwater, and particularly so compared with previous incumbents who won reelection.)

The material question for voters, then, isn’t “Am I better off?” but rather “Are we better off?” Indeed, that was the true focus of the question Reagan framed 40 years ago, a fact that has been too often missed. As the candidate went on to prompt his TV audience in 1980:

Is it easier for you to go and buy things in the stores than it was four years ago? Is there more or less unemployment in the country than there was four years ago? Is America as respected throughout the world as it was? Do you feel that our security is as safe, that we’re as strong as we were four years ago?

U.S. voters today are facing additional questions that drive, perhaps, even more deeply to who we are as a nation: our shared sense of purpose, our trust in the institutions of government and society, even the way we talk and listen to one another. In every election, of course, voters will inevitably make personal choices on the basis of ideology, philosophy, or morality—as it should be. This year, though, there is one fundamental question that voters of every political bent ought to ask before they cast their ballot: Is the United States of America more or less united than it was four years ago?

Me vs. We

“Human nature really is the fundamental force that governs politics in any society at any time,” says Mike Leavitt, who was elected three times as governor of Utah and later served in President George W. Bush’s cabinet as secretary of U.S. Health and Human Services. “And this division between ‘Am I better off?’ and ‘Are we better off?’ is really the conflict between (me) individual liberty and (we) security: We give up one in order to gain the other.” Leavitt, a conservative Republican, sees the struggle between these two eternal goals—liberty and security—as a legitimate, and even necessary contest. But he is concerned with how brutal the battle has become, though he contends the vitriol has been building for far longer than in just the past four years. “We’re seeing people on both extremes who seem willing to color outside the lines, to break the covenant of democracy. And that offends us, and it scares us, because it’s not consistent with [the pact] we’ve all entered into.”

Data from the Pew Research Center shows how hardened the divisions between left and right, Democrat and Republican have become. Though the major parties are growing further apart on issues, the bigger concern is not ideological but personal. “Partisan antipathy—this is the sense that I not only disagree with the opposing party, but I take a rather negative view of the people in that party—has been growing since the mid-1990s,” says Carroll Doherty, the Pew Center’s director of political research. But in 2016, Doherty says, those negative feelings began to spike. The share of Republicans who describe Democrats as more immoral than other Americans grew from 47% in 2016 to 55% in 2019, according to Pew research. The share of Democrats who describe Republicans as immoral rose 12 percentage points, from 35% to 47%. Nearly two-thirds (63%) of Republicans surveyed by Pew said Democrats are more “unpatriotic” than other Americans (23% of Democrats feel the same about Republicans), and the share in each party who view the other as more “close-minded” or “l(fā)azy” than their countrymen has climbed as well. Overwhelming majorities in both parties say the divide between them is growing, with some three-quarters of Republicans and Democrats acknowledging that they “cannot agree on basic facts” when it comes to the views of the other side. Dispiritingly, Pew found, huge percentages on both sides of the aisle (53% of Republicans and 41% of Democrats) do not want their leaders to seek “common ground” with the other party if it means giving up anything.

Doherty emphasizes that Pew’s latest study was conducted a year before the presidential election—and before the coronavirus pandemic: “While we can’t extrapolate?…?it’s possible that these negative sentiments could have grown,” he notes.

“There is this existential struggle for the soul of America in which neither side can win, and it’s all about the threat of the other side,” says political scientist Lee Drutman, a senior fellow in the political reform program at the New America foundation. “We have half of the country who’s convinced that the other half of the country—if they got power—would be illegitimate and substantially destructive.” Drutman, whose book Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop: The Case for Multiparty Democracy in America was published in January, contends that the escalating hyper-partisanship has “simplified” politics into this us-versus-them, good-versus-evil binary.

Trump’s rhetoric has been an “accelerant” to the long-simmering anger on both sides, says Drutman. The fiery invocations he unleashed at his campaign rallies didn’t end when he got to the White House. They got louder and fiercer and were echoed on social media. Says Alan Abramowitz, a professor of political science at Emory University: “He went from dog whistles to a bullhorn”—from quietly tapping into racial, ethnic, and partisan resentment to stadium-size chants.

The high-decibel roar of his MAGAphone has had an effect that goes well beyond “rallying the base,” says Lilliana Mason, associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, and author of the book, Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. It has encouraged and even normalized politically based violence, she says—pointing, for example, to the rise in “anti-immigrant” hate groups in the U.S., which has risen in parallel with the anti-immigration rhetoric of politicians. (The number of such groups has more than doubled since 2014, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center.) “There are a lot of people warning about radical, mainly right-wing, violence specifically around the 2020 election,” says Mason, “but we’ve already seen heavily armed men walking through American cities.” To glimpse the potential danger, witness the brazen plot by members of self-styled militia groups to kidnap Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, which was revealed by the FBI in October. These are things “we couldn’t even imagine in 2016,” Mason says.

A long to-do list

As much as this negative partisanship has torn America’s social fabric, it has made legislating all the more challenging—particularly at the federal level where “to get anything done, you have to be able to build coalitions that to some extent cross party lines,” says Abramowitz. Indeed, Drutman says the problem goes even deeper: “One of the fundamental conflicts in the American system is that we have political institutions that are set out to encourage broad compromise, and we have a party system that has evolved to make compromise very difficult. So we have a different set of electoral and governing incentives from the start.” The escalation in political vitriol only widens the gap between them.

To thrive over the next century—and in a world that’s more competitive, economically, than ever before—Americans must invest in the nation, just as any business needs to invest in itself in order to grow. That means funding job reskilling programs and rebuilding critical infrastructure, a sprawling mandate that spans from repairing crumbling roads and bridges to constructing advanced 5G telecom networks. The Social Security system did not get less wobbly on its own; it will need to be fixed somehow. We still have to rein in runaway health care costs, and get the still-raging pandemic under control, to say nothing of preparing for whatever outbreaks are yet to come. There are even knottier problems to contend with—climate change, criminal justice reform, crafting an immigration policy that sustains both industry, U.S. security, and a sense of fairness. And ultimately, we’ll have to find a way to put the millions of people who lost their jobs in the wake of COVID-19 shutdowns back to work (see our election package). It’s no small list of must-dos.

Paying for all of this is, if anything, a more daunting challenge: Our spendaholic leaders in both parties have already emptied America’s wallet, and we’re in hock up to our shorts. The federal debt held by the public will reach 106% of our GDP in 2023, according to the Congressional Budget Office (see chart)—and the fever line rises relentlessly from there. We’ll have to be creative and ambitious in our problem-solving—and, yes, that means the warring parties must set aside their bitterness and work together.

It also means we’ll have to hot-wire business growth in the U.S. “It sounds probably academic and otherworldly to say the solution is innovation,” says Edmund Phelps, winner of the 2006 Nobel Prize in Economics and director of the Center on Capitalism and Society at Columbia University. “But quite frankly, I’m not sure how far we can progress if we don’t get the economy to be delivering better than it has been for the past 40 or 50 years.” Phelps says he is happy that companies are starting to aggressively push back on Trump administration tariffs as well as on an immigration policy that is “blocking the talents that companies need for developing new products.” Phelps is particularly keen to see the next administration embrace international trade. “It could be a source of new energy in the business sector in this country. That will be great for jobs and wage rates and everything else,” he says.

Sandi Peterson, a member of the board of directors at Microsoft and a partner at Clayton Dubilier & Rice, a New York private equity firm, is equally frustrated with Trump’s immigration policy. “If we don’t get our act together, the innovation engine of the United States—where all the smartest people in the world showed up and created all this amazing stuff—is gone,” she says. “People won’t come here to study anymore. People won’t come here to try to work anymore, because they can’t get visas,” says Peterson, who was formerly group worldwide chairman for Johnson & Johnson. Luring talent from overseas “is what has driven the economy of this country for an incredibly long time—and we just really messed it up.”

The challenge for voters, on this front, is to guess what’s the best way to fix this: Give Trump another chance or clear the slate and start over.

Trust and credibility

Whoever ends up being in charge on Jan. 20, 2021, will have another urgent task: rebuilding trust in the institutions of government itself. Over the past four years, agencies that used to be considered nonpartisan and independent from political pressure—including the CDC, FDA, and the Justice Department—have been viewed by many with skepticism and suspicion, as they have seemed to bend to White House talking points. “All of these institutions used to be neutral arbiters,” says New America’s Drutman. “And in a political system where everybody can agree on a basic procedural fairness and can accept the idea of a legitimate opposition, then these institutions can maintain their independence.” But this is one more lost treasure, it seems, in our era of fevered hyper-partisanship.

Such infighting has implications for our national security, says the University of Maryland’s Mason: President George Washington warned against this in his farewell address, she reminds us. “If you allow factions to form, you open the nation to foreign interference because we start fighting ourselves,” says Mason. “When we create this very deep partisan divide, it makes us weaker as a nation, and it makes it much easier for other nations to mess with us.”

Brian Finlay, president and CEO of the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan think tank devoted to studying global security and other critical issues, agrees. “We’re now in a world where our adversaries have identified the fundamental weaknesses of our system,” says Finlay. “They’ve exploited the divisions. They’ve exploited the technology weakness that they’ve seen by convincing our children that the Washington Post doesn’t have credibility. Our adversaries have wised up, and now they’re attacking our elections, which is like shooting fish in a barrel. They don’t need to send armed combatants to the United States. They can do it from their basement computers.”

It is hard enough to defend against such asynchronous warfare. It is harder still to do it without alliances, partnerships, and pacts. The U.S. has long entered into multilateral agreements—to stem Soviet expansion and aggression in the Cold War, limit the spread of nuclear weapons around the world, prevent illegal fishing, and naturally, sell more American goods.

But in the past four years, President Trump has pulled us away from many of these critically important alliances—even “terminating” our relationship (in the middle of a global pandemic) with the World Health Organization, an institution that the U.S. pushed for, and helped create, in 1948. He has also scuttled the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, says Finlay.

We also exited the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that President Ronald Reagan signed with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, and which helped to end the Cold War. We abandoned the Open Skies Treaty, which had broad bipartisan support, and Trump yanked the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement on climate change.

These are yet more self-inflicted wounds when it comes to America’s health, prosperity, and security—and one more consideration for voters as they head to the polls. But let’s keep it simple: Are we better off than we were four years ago, or is it time for a change??

This article appears in the November 2020 issue of Fortune.

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