????維塞爾引用的另一個(gè)例子是施樂公司（Xerox）的帕洛阿爾托研究所（PARC），也就是這家知名復(fù)印機(jī)公司的研發(fā)部門。正是它在20世紀(jì)70年代開發(fā)了個(gè)人電腦、圖形用戶界面、鼠標(biāo)和以太網(wǎng)，后來卻無一繼續(xù)開發(fā)，均告流產(chǎn)。將該部門的總部放在美國大陸的另一側(cè)——加州的帕羅阿托實(shí)屬明智之舉，因?yàn)檫@樣就能免得公司總部那些斤斤計(jì)較的管理人員對(duì)它過度關(guān)注。而且施樂非常富有遠(yuǎn)見地預(yù)見到了即將到來的信息革命。維塞爾借此表達(dá)了一個(gè)主要觀點(diǎn)：“如果貴公司內(nèi)部已經(jīng)有了那些準(zhǔn)備摧毀任何新嘗試的抗體，你就需要走出公司去克服它們的消極影響?！?/p>

????但是到了需要為自己的個(gè)人電腦阿爾托（Alto）開展?fàn)I銷時(shí)，施樂卻只是簡單地把產(chǎn)品往已有的銷售渠道里一塞了事。它沒有向公司高管和私營企業(yè)主（或是家庭市場）去推銷，而是試著把阿爾托賣給那些購買施樂復(fù)印機(jī)的中層管理者。結(jié)果導(dǎo)致一敗涂地。

????但是，像施樂這么專注、創(chuàng)新和聰明的公司，怎么會(huì)在推銷自己的新技術(shù)時(shí)三次都宣告失敗呢？正是因?yàn)橛锌贵w作祟。就在個(gè)人電腦行將推向市場之際，施樂在復(fù)印機(jī)市場上正面臨來自佳能公司（Canon）和其他公司的激烈競爭，使公司的盈利預(yù)期壓力倍增。面對(duì)那些高聲叫嚷著要攫取利潤的投資者，施樂只得將阿爾托匆匆推向市場以取悅他們。維塞爾稱，如果施樂采取了“謹(jǐn)慎的試驗(yàn)性方法”，（這段話出現(xiàn)在該文最讓人沮喪的段落）“避開投資者的注意的話”，結(jié)果很可能會(huì)截然不同。

????但是“謹(jǐn)慎的方法”能催生出同樣的創(chuàng)新成果嗎？維塞爾并未就此給出案例。而且很明顯，避開自己的投資者去做生意總不能算是理想的做法。

????而至少在某些情況下，更好的方法似乎是對(duì)投資者直言相告：我們關(guān)注的是長期收益，如果你們只對(duì)短期利潤感興趣，也許應(yīng)該去選擇利率互換產(chǎn)品或其他類似的金融產(chǎn)品。

????對(duì)那些取得過重大創(chuàng)新成果的大公司來說，它們至少有一次對(duì)自己那些投資者的短期獲利欲望是不予理睬的：蘋果公司（Apple），聯(lián)邦快遞（FedEx），美國電話電報(bào)公司（AT&T）（通過貝爾實(shí)驗(yàn)室），豐田汽車（Toyota），通用電氣（General Electric），索尼公司（Sony）。還有很多，不勝枚舉。這并不是說，投資開展創(chuàng)新毫無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，或者應(yīng)該對(duì)其一味放任，對(duì)投資者也不管不顧。但是，當(dāng)考慮股東的感受成了頭等大事時(shí)，創(chuàng)新基本上無從談起。

????譯者：清遠(yuǎn)

????Another example he cites is Xerox PARC, the copier-maker's famous research division, which in the '70s developed a personal computer, the graphical user interface, the mouse, and Ethernet, and proceeded to capitalize on none of them. It was a great idea to situate the division's headquarters a continent away in Palo Alto, Calif., to prevent the bean-counters at corporate HQ from paying too much attention. And Xerox (XRX) was truly visionary in anticipating the coming information revolution. This is one of Wessel's main points: "If antibodies already exist within your organization to destroy new endeavors, you need to go outside of the organization to overcome them."

????But when it came time to market its PC, the Alto, Xerox simply jammed the thing into its existing sales channels. Rather than marketing to corporate executives and self-employed entrepreneurs (or possibly the home market), Xerox tried to sell the Alto to the same mid-level decision-makers who bought the company's copiers. Massive fail.

????But why, given how committed, innovative and smart Xerox clearly was, did it fail on all three counts when it came time to sell its new technology? The antibodies. Just as the PC was being readied for market, Xerox was facing all kinds of competition in the copier market from Canon (CAJ) and others, putting pressure on margins. Xerox rushed the Alto to market to appease investors who were clamoring for profits.

????Wessel says Xerox would have done better to employ a "lean approach to experimentation" that would (in the essay's most depressing phrase) "fly under the radar of investors."

????But would a "lean approach" have yielded the same innovations? Wessel doesn't make a case that it would have. And clearly, hiding from your own investors isn't an ideal way to do business.

????A better approach, in at least some cases, seems to be to tell investors that you're in it for the long haul, and if they're interested only in short-term profits, maybe they should check out interest-rate swaps, or something.

????One need only look at the list of big companies that have, at least at one time or another, implemented major innovations, often despite the short-term wishes of their own investors: Apple (AAPL), FedEx (FDX), AT&T (T) (via Bell Labs), Toyota (TM), General Electric (GE), Sony (SNE). Many more. Which is not to say that investing in innovation is risk-free or should be undertaken with wild abandon and zero thought for investors. But innovation rarely arises when shareholder sentiment is the primary consideration.