????除了已經(jīng)認(rèn)罪的六位員工和某些尚未被證明的違法行為（馬托瑪和斯坦伯格還未認(rèn)罪），檢察官的其余指控都極具爭議性。SAC的律師團(tuán)隊由Willkie Farr & Gallagher律師事務(wù)所的馬丁?克勞斯和Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison律師事務(wù)所的丹尼爾?J?克萊默領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。他們在本周一向SAC全體員工發(fā)表了一份長達(dá)46頁的白皮書，對美國證券交易委員會對科恩提起的民事行政訴訟進(jìn)行了反駁，前者控訴科恩未能盡到監(jiān)督兩位投資組合經(jīng)理參與惠氏、Elan和戴爾三支股票內(nèi)幕交易之職。

????此文件尚未被政府駁回。表面看來，這份文件成功地質(zhì)疑了科恩存在同上述特定交易相關(guān)的任何不當(dāng)行為，并振振有詞地鼓吹SAC的合規(guī)項目，稱它是業(yè)界開始最早、最成熟、成本最高昂、影響最深遠(yuǎn)的此類項目，目前有38名全職雇員從事該工作。據(jù)稱該項目包括“每天審查”電子郵件和即時通訊信息、100%保留電子數(shù)據(jù)的政策、限制使用專家網(wǎng)絡(luò)乃至監(jiān)控員工通信。確實，這些關(guān)鍵的合規(guī)措施大都是在上述起訴所聚焦的數(shù)筆交易發(fā)生后才實行，但它們實施之時SAC好像也確實還不知道自身會遭遇目前的調(diào)查。

????不過，無論SAC的律師們能從巴哈納納的訴訟書中發(fā)現(xiàn)哪些漏洞，6名投資組合經(jīng)理的俯首認(rèn)罪似乎才是他真正想要的，而且已經(jīng)證據(jù)確鑿。（事實上，按照現(xiàn)行法律，法官可以只靠一名員工的違法行為就給公司定罪，甚至該員工最后還能被無罪釋放！）現(xiàn)在唯一懸而未決的——或者說可以商量的——就是如何處罰，SAC能否以某種形式繼續(xù)得以生存。也許通過和解程序，例如更換SAC的高管團(tuán)隊，檢方會同意放棄起訴。（例如大名鼎鼎的Milberg律師事務(wù)所雖然在2006年因為敲詐勒索被集體訴訟，但最后還是逃過一劫。Milberg辭退了3位涉案合伙人，同時繳納了7,500萬美元罰金，訴訟才最后得以和解。）

????從科恩的律師發(fā)布的報告來看，科恩本人可能在美國證券交易委員會（SEC）的行政訴訟中受審，后者正力圖禁止他繼續(xù)從事證券業(yè)。為了避免自己的公司在刑事案件中遭遇慘敗，科恩可能不得不放棄自己在行政訴訟中的全部生機。(財富中文網(wǎng))

????譯者：項航??

????With the exception of the fact that the guilty pleas and the as yet unproven indictments have occurred (Martoma and Steinberg have pleaded not guilty), all the government's accusations are sharply disputed. SAC's lawyers, led by Martin Klotz at Willkie Farr & Gallagher and Daniel J. Kramer at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, have given a sneak peek of what their responses will look like in a 46-page White Paper disseminated to SAC's employees on Monday. It responds to the Securities and Exchange Commission's civil administrative charges against Cohen, whom the commission accuses of having failed to adequately supervise two portfolio managers in connection with their trading in three stocks -- Wyeth, Elan, and Dell.

????The paper -- not yet rebutted, of course, by the government -- succeeds in raising on its face plenty of doubts about any impropriety by Cohen in connection with those particular trades, and it also plausibly touts SAC's compliance program -- which now has 38 full-time employees -- as being one of the earliest, most sophisticated, most expensive, and most far-reaching in the industry. It allegedly includes "daily reviews" of email and IMs; a 100% electronic retention policy; restrictions on the use of expert networks; and even surveillance of employee communications. It is true that most of these key compliance measures were instituted after the trades that are the focus of the indictments, but it also appears to be true that they were instituted before SAC became aware of the current investigation.

????But regardless of whatever holes SAC's lawyers can shoot in Bhrara's peripheral allegations, the guilty pleas of the six portfolio managers are all Bharara seems to need under the current law, and they've already happened. (In fact, under existing law, you can convict a corporation based on an employee's alleged wrongdoing even if the employee is ultimately acquitted!) All that remains to be determined -- and probably negotiated -- are the penalties and whether SAC will be permitted to survive in some form, perhaps through the mechanism of the government agreeing to dismiss the indictment in exchange for SAC's execution of a non-prosecution agreement. (The Milberg class-action law firm survives to this day, for instance, notwithstanding having been indicted on racketeering charges in 2006. After its three indicted partners left the firm, Milberg was allowed to enter a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for a $75 million fine.)

????Though Cohen himself, judging from his lawyers' White Paper, might have a triable case in the SEC's administrative action, where the commission seeks to ban him for life from the securities industry, Cohen may have to trade away whatever fighting chance he has there to avert catastrophe to his firm in the criminal case.